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et al.: Employment Law

EMPLOYMENT LAW
I. COURT CONSIDERS SCTCA's LIABILITY CAP IN
WHISTLEBLOWER CONTEXT

In McGill v. University of South Carolina' the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the statutory liability cap contained in the South Carolina Tort

Claims Act2 does not apply to damages awarded under the South Carolina

Whistleblower Act (the "Act"). 3 In its holding, the court not only provided
some guidance to the elements of retaliatory discharge under the Whistleblower Act, but it also increased the potential liability to public bodies taking
adverse action against employees who report activities protected under the Act.
The source of the litigation in McGill was the University of South
Carolina's ("USC") discharge of Helen McGill on October 2, 1989, one day
prior to her achieving full-time employee status.4 On April 3, 1989, USC
hired McGill, an employee-at-will, as USC's Hazardous Waste Manager.5
Her responsibilities included ensuring the university's compliance with state
and federal regulations regarding hazardous waste storage and disposal. USC
allegedly hired McGill in part because of her prior employment experience
with the Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC"). 6 In
July and August of 1989, McGill reported suspected violations of state law and
DHEC regulations to various public agencies and to USC's legal department.7
The alleged violations concerned spills and leaks from six drums of out-ofcompliance waste.' USC was fined for the violations. 9 Shortly thereafter,
USC fired McGill for "gross negligence and insubordination" in her work
performance. '0
The jury awarded McGill $350,000 in her suit against USC under the
South Carolina Whistleblower Act." Although the trial court denied USC's
post-trial motion for JNOV, it granted USC's motion to reduce the verdict to

1. __ S.C. _, 423 S.E.2d 109 (1992).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120 (a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
3. McGill, __ S.C. at __,423 S.E.2d at 110. The South Carolina Whistleblower Act is
codified in S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-27-10 to -50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
4. McGill, __ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 110.
5. Id. at __, 423 S.E.2d at 110.
6. Final Brief of Appellant/Respondent at 3.
7. McGill, __ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 110. Final Brief of Appellant/Respondentat 2.
8. Final Brief of Appellant/Respondentat 6 (citing Trial Record at 612-13).
9. Id. at 11 (citing Trial Record at 456). USC was fined for environmental violations, but
not for civil penalties under the Whistleblower Act.
423 S.E.2d at 110.
10. McGill, - S.C. at,
11. Id. at _, 423 S.E.2I at 110; see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-27-10 to -50 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1992).
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the statutory $250,000 liability cap provided by the South Carolina Tort
Claims Act, and granted McGill's motion for $86,000 in costs and attorney's
2
fees.'
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of
USC's motion for JNOV and the award for costs and attorney's fees, but
reinstated the $350,000 verdict, thereby reversing the reduction imposed by
the trial court. 3 First, in addressing the denial of USC's motion for JNOV,
the court discussed the respective burdens, the available affirmative defenses,
and the adoption of the good faith whistleblowing standard under the Act.' 4
Second, the court held that the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, limiting the
liability of any governmental agency to $250,000 "for any action or claim for
damages brought" thereunder, was on its face irrelevant to whistleblower
suits.' 5 USC argued that because the Tort Claims Act applied to all claims
brought against a government entity, then an action brought pursuant to the
Whistleblower Act (which is available only against public entities in South
Carolina) is also subject to the statutory cap.' 6 The court rejected this
argument stating that there is no language in the Tort Claims Act from which
one can infer that its statutory cap is applicable to whistleblower actions.
Further, the court implied that the purpose of the two acts are separate, and
it noted the lack of legislative intent to limit damages in whistleblower

actions. '7
Apparently, the court refused to adopt the rationale of a similar case
briefed by USC which held that the Colorado Whistleblower Act was subject
to that state's Governmental Immunity Act.'" If influenced at all by this
Colorado decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the
dissenting opinion, which noted that the Colorado legislature amended both
acts in the same year and neither act referenced the other." Similarly, South
Carolina's General Assembly amended the Whistleblower Act in 1989 for the
second time without adding any reference to the Tort Claims Act.'
McGill is only the second case interpreting the Whistleblower Act, and the
supreme court addressed many of the issues commonly raised regarding

12. See McGill, __ S.C. at_, 423 S.E.2d at 110.
13. Id. at __, 423 S.E.2d at 112.
14. Id. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 110-11; see infra text accompanying notes 29-39.
15. McGill, - S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 111 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120(a)(1)

(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
16. Id. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 111.
17. See id. at_, 423 S.E.2d at 111-12.
18. State Personnel Bd. v. Lloyd, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988) (en bane), cited in Final Brief
of Appellant/Respondentat 15-16.
19. See McGill, _ S.C. at ,423 S.E.2d at 111-12; State PersonnelBoard, 752 P.2d at
566 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
20. McGill, __ S.C. at_, 423 S.E.2d at 111-12.
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whisfleblower protection. 2' Whistleblower statutes generally contain six basic
provisions: (1) scope of coverage, (2) protected acts, (3) causation, (4)
defenses, (6) remedies, and (7) procedures. Each provision is discussed
below.
With the enactment of its Whistleblower Act in 1988, South Carolina
joined the majority of states in recognizing a statutory cause of action for
retaliatory discharge of public-sector employees. 22 Coverage extends to
employees of public bodies, thereby encompassing both state and local
government employees. Section 8-27-10 broadly defines the term "public
body" to include "all state, agencies, commissions, boards, and departments;
all public or governmental bodies or political subdivisions of the state. . . and
'any organization, corporation, or agency, supported in whole or in part by
public funds.' "'
The South Carolina Act protects reports of suspected governmental waste
and abuse as well as violations of federal, state, and local laws and regulations. The Whistleblower Act provides:
No public body may discharge [or otherwise retaliate against] any
employee of a public body whenever the employee reports a violation of
any state or federal law or regulation ... or ... exposes governmental
criminality, corruption, waste, fraud, gross negligence, or mismanagement
or testifies as a witness ... involving any of [these] matters .... 24
The Act does not specify the form, content, or transmission manner of the
whistleblowers' report. The Act's silence apparently indicates that the report
may be either oral or written and need not be made internally.'
South
Carolina imposes two requirements for a whistleblower to fall within the Act's

21. The first South Carolina case construing the Whistleblower Act provided insight into only
one aspect of the statute. See Gamble v. City of Manning, 304 S.C. 536, 405 S.E.2d 829 (1991)
(holding that a violation of the Act does not occur if an employee is fired for an independent
cause). For a more extensive discussion of Gamble and the South Carolina Act, see generally
Craig Berman, Note, South Carolina Whistleblower Protection:The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, 43 S.C. L. REV. 415 (1992) (analyzing the policy arguments surrounding whistleblower
acts and comparing South Carolina's Act to others).
22. Thirty-five states provide statutory protection for public employees. Eleven of these states
protect both public and private employees. For a recent listing of state whistleblower acts, see
Hunter R. Hughes, III et al., Counseling the Whistleblower (Part1), PRAC. LAWv. July 1992, at
37.
23. Vance J. Bettis et al., Protectionfor "Whistleblowers" Under South CarolinaLaw, The
Whistleblowers'Act, 14 S.C. JUR. Labor Relations § 41 (1992) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 827-10(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
25. See Berman, supra note 21, at 430. Although not required, McGill notified USC's legal
department of the violation (i.e., internal whistleblowing). See supra text accompanying note 7.
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protection. First, the employee's report must be based on a reasonable
foundation and a good faith belief that the alleged violation occurred. McGill
adopted the majority view in holding that only "good faith whistleblowing and
good faith refusal to follow malevolent instructions are protected" activities.26
By adopting a good faith standard and not requiring a showing of an actual
violation, South Carolina encourages whistleblowing by employees who may
be reluctant to report suspected violations.27 Second, the Act specifies that
a report is unprotected if made without "probable cause." Consequently,
public employers may fire employees making unfounded or false reports. 2s
These two requirements restrict the potential for abuse by disgruntled,
vindictive employees.
The South Carolina Act sets up a burden of proof scheme and a causation
standard for whistleblower actions. 29 Because "it is highly unlikely that an
employer will declare retaliation as the motive for discharge,"30 section 8-2730(A) creates a rebuttable presumption of "wrongful treatment" if an employer
takes adverse action against a public employee within one year of the
employee's reporting of a violation." This presumption allows a whistleblower to present a prima facie case within one year of a reported violation
without proof of a retaliatory motive.3 2 The employer may rebut the
presumption by demonstrating (not proving) that the "discharge or discipline
was unrelated to ... [the] . ..whistleblowing. " However, this requirement clearly places the burden on the employer to show legitimate reasons for
any adverse action. Although the Act is silent on the issue, cases and
commentaries note that the Act's scheme is similar to Title VIP 4 pretext cases

26. McGill, __ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 111 (citing Lanes v. O'Brien, 746 P,2d 1366
(Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Pilcher v. Board of County Comm'rs, 787 P.2d 1204 (Kan. Ct. App.
1990); Tyrna v. Adamo, Inc., 407 N.W.2d 47 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Phipps v. Clark Oil &
Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987)).
27. See Berman, supra note 21, at 432 (arguing for South Carolina's adoption of a good faith
standard prior to the McGill supreme court decision).
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
29. Id. § 8-27-30(A); see also Berman, supra note 21, at 432-33 (discussing the burdens and
causations imposed by the Act).
30. Berman, supra note 21, at 432-33 n.151 (quoting Wallace v. Milliken & Co., 300 S.C.
553, 557, 389 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Ct. App. 1990), aff'das modified, 305 S.C. 118, 406 S.E.2d
358 (1991)).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-30(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
32. Berman, supra note 21, at 432.
33. McGill, _ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 111 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-30(B) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1992)). Arguably, to "demonstrate" requires something less than to "prove." If
the General Assembly intended the presumption to shift the burden of proof rather than the
burden of production, it probably would have chosen the stronger term. Bettis, supra note 23,
§ 44 n.2.
34. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Code is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1990).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss1/9
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in which the burden of production, but not the burden of proof, shifts to the
employer. 5 If the analogy to Title VII cases is accurate, then after the
employer meets its burden, the employee must show that the employer's
explanation was not the true reason for the discipline. 6
Section 8-27-40 of the Act maintains some of the employer's prerogative
in making personnel decisions by stating "a public body may discharge,
otherwise terminate, or suspend an employee for causes independent of those
provided in [the Act].37 Reliance even on improper motives absolves
employers of liability under the statute if employers can prove they took the
action for an "independent cause."" In addition, the Act enumerates the
following affirmative defenses (per se independent causes) that defeat a
whistleblower's claim: "willful or habitual tardiness or absence from work;
being disorderly or intoxicated while at work; destruction of any of the
employer's property; malingering; and embezzlement or larceny of the
employer's property." 39
The South Carolina Act provides for a broad range of remedies including
civil damages, equitable remedies (reinstatement, lost wages, and injunctions),
or both.4 ° Further, the Act allows recovery for actual damages, court costs,
and reasonable attorney's fees. 4 However, the Act does not make allowanc-

35. Berman, supra note 21, at 433 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254 (1981)); see also Wallace, 300 S.C. at 557, 389 S.E.2d at 450 (adopting a
substantial factor test in which a claimant retains the ultimate burden throughout a worker's
compensation retaliatory discharge case).
36. Berman, supra note 21, at 434 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 256 (1991)).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-40 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1992).
38. See Gamble v. City of Manning, 304 S.C. 536, 405 S.E.2d 829 (1991) (finding
independent cause to be a jury question). Unlike pretext cases that assume a single cause for the
adverse personnel action, this mixed-motive analysis (implicitly addressed in the Act's reference
to "independent cause") assumes the decision involves many causes, one of which may be
retaliatory as long as another is legitimate. Final Brief of Respondent/Appellant at 14 (citing
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989) (White, J., concurring)); see also
Berman, supra note 21 at 434 (stating that the Act effectively adopts the standard for mixedmotive cases stated in Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977)).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-30(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); see also McGill v. University
of S.C., _ S.C. at _, _, 423 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1992) (noting USC's concession that none
of the Act's available defenses applied).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-30(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
41. Id. § 8-27-30(C); see also McGill, _ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 110, 112 (allowing
recovery of approximately $86,000 in court costs and attorney's fees). McGill's prayer for
damages included back and front pay, loss of reputation, loss of earning capacity, loss of selfconfidence and esteem, mental anguish, and humiliation. Final Brief of Respondent/Appellant
at 34. Fringe benefits and seniority rights may also be available as an element of damages. Jack
R. Clary et al., State and Local Government Bargaining, 5 LAB. L.J. 434, 441 (1989).
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es for recovery of punitive damages. 42 Commentators argue that this
omission is troubling because the deterrent effect of punitive damages does not
fit easily into a cost-benefit analysis that an employer may rely on in its
potentially retaliatory decision.43 The South Carolina Act contains an unusual
provision designed to encourage whistleblowing which results in public
savings.44 The employee may be rewarded the lesser of $2,000 or twentyfive percent of estimated net savings accumulated during the first year of any
cost-saving changes implemented as a result of the employee's report. 45
Neither the Act nor case law addresses the issues of exhaustion and exclusivity
of remedies in whistleblower actions. Further, the Act does not impose any
civil penalties on public bodies that violate the Act although such fines or
suspensions could lead to greater enforcement and deterrence.
Some final aspects of the Act are worth mentioning. The Act allows the
employee to choose between a jury or nonjury civil trial in one of two forums:
the court of common pleas in the county where the employee resides when the
action is filed, or the county where the retaliation occurred. 46 Finally, the
Act imposes a two-year statute of limitations commencing from the accrual
time of the cause of action. 47
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in McGill v. University of
South Carolina clarifies some of the elements of claims brought under the
South Carolina Whistleblower Act. To be effective, the statute not only must
be drafted to provide maximum protection to whistleblowers, but also must
receive favorable judicial interpretation.4" The significance of McGill lies in
the supreme court's broad reading of the Act which furthers its deterrent goal.
By adopting a good faith reporting standard and refusing to cap the size of
42. See Kevin D. Hill, Whistleblower: A Study ofAlternative Remedies, 4 TEMP. ENVTL. L.
& TECH. J. 50, 56 (1985).
43. Id. at 56-57 (noting, for example, that it may be more profitable to discharge an employee
who voices concern over potential environmental damage than to comply with costly environmental regulations); see Robert D. Boyle, A Review of Whistle Blower Protectionsand Suggestions
for Change,41 LAB. L.J. 821, 829 (1990) (concludingpunitive damages are a necessary element
of effective whistleblower legislation). Both the Alaska and California acts allow punitive
damages. ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.120 (Supp. 1991); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 10550(c) (,Vest 1980
& Supp. 1991). The Louisiana and North Carolina acts provide a great incentive for compliance
by imposing treble damages for whistleblower violations. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027
(B)(1) (Supp. 1992) (allowing treble damages only when retaliation results from environmental
reports); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-87 (1991) (allowing treble damages in all whistlebloweractions
in which employers willfully violate the statute).
44. See Clary, supra note 41, at 441.
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992); see also Clary, supra note 41,
at 441.
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-30(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
47. Id. § 8-27-30(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
48. See Terry M. Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?,
25 AM. Bus. L.J. 241 (1987).
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verdicts, the court balances the competing interests of employees, employers,
and the public. At a minimum, this case should serve as a clear warning to
public employers of the potential liability exposure involved in their personnel
decisions.4 9 Only future decisions will clarify all the issues surrounding the
statutorily created whistleblowing exception in this yet untested area of
employment law in South Carolina. Although McGill still leaves many
questions open, it serves as impetus for future litigation in this growing area
of practice.
L. Scott Askins

49. See Kenneth T. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial
Assessment of the LaborLaw Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAw. 1, 26-27 (1984) (discussingpossible
preventive practices for employers to take to reduce the risk of wrongful discharge liability). The
timing of McGill's termination one day prior to her reaching permanent status possibly influenced
, __, 423 S.E.2d 109, 110 (1992).
the jury. See McGill V. University of S.C., _ S.C.
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